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"Promise, large promise, is the soul of an advertisement"
Samuel Johnson,
The Idler No. 41
I. GENERAL BACKGROUNDS INCE THE height of the Industrial Revolution and particularly
in this century, the merchants and manufacturers of our nation
have found their business responsibilities and obligations constantly
changing as courts evolved and redefined the rules governing the
traditional manufacturer-merchant-consumer relationships. Caveat
emptor has made an osmotic migration from the law of sales to the
realm of legal history, while such concepts as strict liability in tort
and implied warranty have become the 20th century judicial re-
sponse to 20th century marketing and technology. In this evolu-
tionary period nearly every aspect of the manufacturer-merchant-
consumer relationship has received judicial scrutiny. Advertising
has been no exception. In the late 1920's and early 1930's, at a
time that was coincidental with the beginning of mass advertising
efforts in the United States, the courts began to express concern
about the advertising aspect of the manufacturer-merchant-consum-
er relationship. Most early cases that considered false or mislead-
ing advertisements were analyzed in terms of negligence' or mis-
representation Soon, however, many courts abandoned these rather
cumbersome analyses and began to characterize and analyze ac-
tions based on false or misleading advertisements as stating claims
* B.S.M.E. University of Cincinnati, 1962; J.D. Southern Methodist University
School of Law, 1966.
'See Hruska v. Parke, Davis & Co., 6 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1925); Jones v.
Raney Chevrolet Co., 213 N.C. 775, 197 S.E.2d 757 (1938).
' See Alpine v. Friend Bros., 244 Mass. 164, 138 N.E. 553 (1923).
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for breach of express warranty. Today, the great majority, if not
all, jurisdictions use the express warranty analysis in considering
damage claims based on false or misleading advertisements.'
II. BENCH-MARKS IN THE EVOLUTION
OF ADVERTISING WARRANTIES
As previously indicated, some courts initially tended to analyze
false and misleading advertisements in the context of actions for
negligence or misrepresentation. The landmark case of Baxter v.
Ford Motor Co.,' however, ordained the coming of age of adver-
tising warranties. In 1930, Mr. Baxter bought a new Model A Ford
Town Sedan from his local Ford dealer. In the course of reaching
his decision to purchase the auto, Mr. Baxter was furnished certain
Ford advertising material. This material included references to the
"Triplex Shatter-Proof Glass Windshield" which was constructed
so "that it will not fly or shatter under the hardest impact." Una-
bashed, Ford continued, "[T]his is an important safety factor be-
cause it eliminates the dangers of flying glass." Shortly after the pur-
chase, a pebble proved conclusively that the Triplex Shatter-Proof
Glass Windshield would, under certain circumstances, shatter. Mr.
Baxter was injured and brought suit against Ford based on the
"shatter-proof" advertisement. Ford urged that no warranty could
exist without privity and, further, that express warranties "do not
attach themselves to, and run with, the article sold." The Washing-
3 Courts have had occasion to consider nearly all advertising methods in con-
nection with "advertising" warranties:
(a) newspapers-Lane v. Swanson & Sons Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 210,
278 P.2d 723 (1955);
(b) pamphlets-Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254
(6th Cir. 1960);
(c) catalogues-Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409
(1939);
(d) radio-Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309
(1939);
(e) billboards-ld.
(f) magazines-Pritchard v. Liggett-Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292
(3rd Cir. 1961);
(g) advance bulletin-Sawan, Inc. v. American Cyanimid, 211 Ga. 764,
88 S.E.2d 152 (1955);
(h) pictures-Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.
1968);
(i) "all media"-Ford Motor Co. v. Lemieux, 418 S.W.2d 909 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967).
4 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1939).
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ton Supreme Court responded with language that was to become
the oft-quoted basis for advertising warranties:
Since the rule of caveat emptor was first formulated, vast changes
have taken place in the economic structures of the English speak-
ing peoples. Methods of doing business have undergone a great
transition. Radio, billboards, and the products of the printing press
have become the means of creating a large part of the demand that
causes goods to depart from factories to the ultimate consumer.
It would be unjust to recognize a rule that would permit manu-
facturers of goods to create a demand for their products by repre-
senting that they possess qualities which they, in fact, do not pos-
sess, and then, because there is no privity of contract existing be-
tween the consumer and the manufacturer, deny the consumer the
right to recover if damages result from the absence of those quali-
ties, when such absence is not readily noticeable.'
In 1936, the Hudson Motor Company, not to be outdone by
Ford's Triplex Shatter-Proof Glass Windshield, heavily advertised
its new Hudsons and Terraplanes as possessing "safety engineered"
bodies complete with "an improved seamless steel roof." Much like
Mr. Baxter, Mr. Bahlman purchased a new 1936 Model Hudson
Eight Sedan after reading the advertisements. Shortly thereafter,
Mr. Bahlman had a roll-over type accident and suffered severe lac-
erations from a welded seam in the roof above the driver's seat-
with the result that the facts underlying Bahlman v. Hudson Motor
Car Co.' became history. The Michigan Supreme Court wholeheart-
edly embraced the Baxter rationale and Bahiman became the con-
firmation of the Baxter approach to advertising warranties.
More recently the Supreme Court of Ohio in Rogers v. Toni
Home Permanent Co.' and the New York Court of Appeals in
Randy Knitware v. American Cyanamid Co.' favorably re-examin-
ed the historical bases for "advertising" warranties. In Randy Knit-
ware the court noted that Baxter had "breached the citadel of priv-
ity" and further stated:
... in the 30 years which have passed since that decision [Baxter],
not only have the courts throughout the country shown a marked,
and almost uniform, tendency to discard the privity limitation and
5 Id. at 459, 12 P.2d at 412.
1290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).
1167 Ohio 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
8 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
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hold the manufacturer strictly accountable for the truthfulness of
representations made to the public and relied upon by the plain-
tiff in making his purchase, but the vast majority of the authorita-
tive commentators have applauded the trend and approved the
result.' (footnotes omitted)
In 1965, the law of advertising warranties was distilled into the
Restatement of Torts 2d, Section 402B:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising,
labels, or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a
material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold
by him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the
chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation
even though:
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller."
Similarly, Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code pro-
vides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(A) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to
the Buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part
of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or prom-
ise. 1
Numerous cases have held that Section 2-313 encompasses adver-
tising warranties." Thus, advertising warranties not only have
achieved considerable vitality in modem case law but have also
been codified and widely adopted in that form.
III. THE LAW OF ADVERTISING WARRANTIES
In broad overview, the establishment of an action based on ad-
vertising warranty requires proof as to the following:
1. Falsity: Any claim based on breach of an advertising warran-
9 d. at 12-13, 181 N.E.2d at 402, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 367-68.
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
"' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-313.
12 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Conner, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967); Capital
Equipment Enterprises v. North Pier Terminal Co., 117 Il1. App. 2d 264, 254
N.E.2d 542 (1969); Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews Construction Co.,
190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
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ty must establish that the portion of the advertisement in question
is false (i.e., is a misrepresentation). As in libel and slander, truth
is a defense.18 The courts generally refer to the falsity issue in terms
of showing the breach of the warranty.
2. Reliance: A consumer asserting a claim founded on an adver-
tising warranty must show reasonable reliance on the particular
portion of the advertisement being challenged. ' Some courts have
articulated the necessary reliance in terms of requiring the adver-
tisement to "induce the purchase or use of a product."'5 The Uni-
form Commercial Code requires that the advertisement become a
"basis of the bargain,"'" while the Restatement uses the phrase
"justifiable reliance."'" Besides constituting an independent element
of modem warranty actions, reliance on the advertisements also
provided an underpinning for the movement against the privity re-
quirement. 8
3. Proximate cause: A claimant bringing an action for breach of
an advertising warrant must establish that the breach of the warran-
ty was a proximate cause of the damages sought. 9 It should be speci-
fically noted that reliance in the purchase or use of the product and
causation between a breach of the warranty and the damages sought
are two independent elements to be established.
4. Intent: Proof of the advertiser's specific intent to "warrant"
the product need not be shown in order to establish a cause of ac-
tion, at least when a reasonable buyer would believe that the words
3 See, e.g., Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 261 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Ind.
1966).
14 Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966);
Pedroli v. Russell, 157 Cal. App. 2d 281, 320 P.2d 873 (1958); Bleacher v.
Bristol-Myers Co., 53 Del. 1, 163 A.2d 526 (1960); Capital Equipment Enter-
prises v. North Pier Terminal Co., 117 Ill. App. 2d 264, 254 N.E.2d 542 (1969).
'
5 See Alpine v. Friend Bros., 244 Mass. 164, 138 N.E. 553 (1923); Brown
v. Globe Laboratories, Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957).
6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
"See, e.g., Randy Knitware v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181
N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.,
167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash.
456, 12 P.2d 409 (1939).
"See, e.g., Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968);
Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939); Brown
v. Globe Laboratories, Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957).
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used had the purpose of inducing a sale." Of course, an advertise-
ment is, almost by definition, intended to contain words to induce
a sale. Thus, in practical terms, there is no requirement of intent.
5. Language Used In The Advertisement: Probably the most sub-
stantive aspect of a claim based on breach of an advertising war-
ranty relates to the actual language used in the alleged warranty.
The advertising must be examined to determine if it can be char-
acterized as "fact," "material fact," "opinion," "comparison," "spe-
cific," "general," "description," "estimate," "judgment," "condition,"
"dealer's talk," "puffing," "praise," or any one of a multitude of
other characterizations the courts have used in particular cases.
In essence, the advertising language relied on must represent some
fact to constitute an express warranty. The categorization of the
types of statements that cannot be the basis of an advertising war-
ranty was typically stated by the Nebraska Supreme Court in
Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc." as follows:
[R]epresentations which merely express the vendor's opinion, be-
lief, judgment, or estimate do not constitute a warranty. Dealer's
talk is permissible; and puffing, or praise of the goods by the seller,
is no warranty, such representations falling within the maxim sim-
plex commendatio non obligat."
Unfortunately, these classifications, while easy to state, are much
more difficult to apply. Like beauty, the distinction between "facts,"
"opinions," "sales talk," etc., seems often to be affected by the eye
of the beholder. How does one then determine what language can
establish an advertising warranty? It is settled that the language
need not expressly use the terms "warrants," "guarantees," or words
of similar import.' Most authorities, however, indicate that a speci-
fic factual assertion is strictly required to establish a warranty.
These authorities are typified by the statement in Adkins v. Ford
Motor Co., that "a particular and specific statement concerning
quality or fitness" is required.' The element of specificity, how-
21 See, e.g., Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir.
1960); Turner v. Central Hardware Co., 353 Mo. 1182, 186 S.W.2d 603 (1945).
21 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957).
21d. at -, 84 N.W.2d at 161, quoting from Ralston Purina Co. v. Iiams;
143 Neb. 588, 10 N.W.2d 452 (1943).
I'Supra note 20.
-4446 F.2d 1105, 1108 (6th Cir. 1971) (The court was applying Tennessee
law).
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ever, has occasionally been relaxed, as when an Ohio court deem-
ed the words "good condition" to be a warranty when used in an
advertisement for the sale of a secondhand piano.'
The advertising warranty cases most significant to practitioners in
the field of products liability, particularly in the aircraft litigation
area, are those involving advertising language relating to safety. A
case which typifies courts' reaction to safety language is Turner v.
Central Hardware Co.' The defendant advertised its "safety-first"
ladders stating that, "in designing our ladders the prime considera-
tion was safety-and that's what you'll find in these splendid lad-
ders." A rung broke, the plaintiff fell and the Missouri Supreme
Court ultimately concluded that the safety language in the adver-
tisement constituted an express warranty. The court specifically re-
jected the contention that the language was only "opinion" or
"sales talk."" Similarly, advertisements extolling a home-permanent
as being "safe and harmless,"' a toy pistol as being "absolutely
harmless,"' and skin cream as being "clinically proven and absolute-
ly safe"" have been held to provide proper bases for advertising
warranties. One court has been more lenient by concluding an ad-
vertisement that "their product offered unprecedented safety" was
mere "opinion" and permissible "puffing."'"
In determining if advertising language gives rise to an express
warranty, a California court held that the language must be con-
strued liberally in favor of the buyer. Also, in cases involving
large scale multi-media advertisements, judicial notice has been
taken of the advertisements.'
6. Disclaimer. The unusual circumstances in which an adver-
tiser would attempt to disclaim the language used in an advertise-
2Schwartz v. Gross, 93 Ohio App. 445, 114 N.E.2d 103 (1952).
"1353 Mo. 1182, 186 S.W.2d 603 (1945).
27 Id. at -, 186 S.W.2d at 605.
28 Id. at -, 186 S.W.2d at -.
29 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612
(1958).
"0Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N.Y.S. 496 (1930).
31 Spiegel v. Saks 34th St., 43 Misc.2d 1066, 252 N.Y.S. 852 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
"2 Hoffman v. A. B. Chance Co., 339 F. Supp. 1385, 1388 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
"3 Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P.2d 723 (1955).
14 Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, -, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94,
103 (1966).
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ment and then rely on the disclaimer as a defense in an advertising
warranty case has not been directly litigated. One would presume,
however, that courts would be as reluctant to enforce disclaimers
in this area as they have been in other sales cases and would im-
pose all the requirements of conspicuousness, specificity, etc. One
court that has considered an alleged disclaimer of an "advertising"
warranty demonstrated considerable hesitancy in recognizing this
defense.'
7. Dealer's Responsibility For Manufacturer's Advertising. Gen-
erally, the entity making an express warranty is liable for the breach
thereof, and an entity which has not joined in the warranty cannot
be held liable. In the case of advertising warranties made by a
manufacturer, however, it appears that the dealer is liable for
breach of warranty if the manufacturer's pamphlets or written ad-
vertisements which establish the warranty are furnished by the re-
tailer to the consumer." A dealer would seem to risk liability for
the manufacturer's advertising warranties by bringing them to the
attention of the purchaser. This would appear to be the case even
though the dealer may not actually or expressly affirm the war-
ranties.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS AND REFLECTIONS ON THE
UTILIZATION AND DEFENSE OF CLAIMS FOR
BREACH OF AN ADVERTISING WARRANTY.
The facts giving rise to many product liability cases make the
strict liability in tort approach much more attractive than breach of
an advertising warranty. In this day and age, lawyers, courts, and
probably juries are more attuned to the "defect" and "unreasonably
dangerous" concepts embodied in the strict liability in tort theory.
Lawyers should be aware, however, of possible benefits in some
factual situations of combining the advertising warranty and strict
liability in tort actions.
If a manufacturer or seller has been overzealous in advertising
its product and if the consumer can show reliance, a claim for
breach of an advertising warranty should be seriously considered.
'5 Cooper Painting & Coatings, Inc. v. SCM Corp., 62 Tenn. App. 13, 457
S.W.2d 864 (1970).
" Silverstein v. R. H. Macy & Co., 266 App. Div. 5, 40 N.Y.S. 916 (1943).
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In some instances a warranty claim may be even more attractive
than one based on strict liability in tort since no proof of a defect
is required." In essence, an advertiser may raise the legal standard
of care that it owes to the purchasing public by making express
representations in its advertising. The concept is succinctly stated
in Bryer v. Rath Packing Company:
In the instant case the packer of the chicken set its own standard
of care and increased the necessary amount of care by expressly
representing on the cans sold that the product was ready to serve
and boned. 8
The Sixth Circuit in Hansen v. Firestone Rubber Co. expressed the
same concept another way:
[T]he seller has bound himself unqualifiedly as to the existence of
the characteristics of qualities warranted; and absolute liability
against the warrantor is available to the buyer who is injured by
the non-existence of such characteristics or qualities."
Some circumstances may also arise for which particular adver-
tisements can be effectively used to persuade the fact finder that a
defect existed in connection with a strict liability in tort claim. In
such circumstances, the easiest way to gain admission of the adver-
tising evidence may be to include a claim for breach of an adver-
tising warranty. At least one court has taken judicial notice of ad-
vertisements, and, in light of evidence reflecting the product's non-
conformity with the advertisements, concluded that the ad was pro-
bative evidence of a defect."'
From the defense lawyer's standpoint, a motion for severance
should be seriously considered if it appears that the advertising
complained of could be of aid and comfort to the plaintiff where he
combines strict liability in tort with an allegation based on ad-
37 Syvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968).
80221 Md. 105, -, 156 A.2d 442, 446 (1959).
89 276 F.2d 254, 257 (6th Cir. 1960).
40McCann v. Atlas Supply Co., 325 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Pa. 1971). The
court stated:
Prospective purchases are the objects of sustained and vigorous
advertising campaigns extolling the touchness of automobile tires,
their reliability and dependability. Common experience indicates
that no owner of a tire expects it to fail with less than 2,000 miles
on its treads.
325 F. Supp. at 704.
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vertising warranty. This is particularly true when it can be per-
suasively argued that the standard of care that the advertiser has
imposed on himself is higher than the legal standard of care imposed
by strict liability in tort theory. It seems certain that asking a jury
to segregate evidence in the two different causes of action and to
apply different standards of care thereto militates in favor of sev-
erance.
In defending advertising warranties, disregard privity and, ex-
cept for some limited types of consequential damages, dismiss dis-
claimers as well. In most instances, the most vulnerable portion of
the plaintiff's case is reliance and proximate cause, and this evi-
dence can and should be rigorously attacked. A somewhat less ef-
fective defense is the "puffing" or "dealer's talk" exception to ad-
vertising warranties. To make this defense effective, a defendant
has to overcome the inherent weakness of the "we said it, but you
shouldn't have believed it" position. Finally, the fundamental de-
fense of truth (absence of breach) may be available.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the last half of the 19th century and through most
of this century, the pattern of commodity production in our nation
has shifted from small-scale, cottage-type to large-scale, mass-
oriented production. With the tremendous rise in our productive
capabilities, private manufacturers have sought to utilize various
means to maintain higher and higher levels of consumer demand
for their goods. Advertising has provided a major tool for this de-
mand-maintenance. Through the use of advertising on a national
and regional scale, the manufacturers have reached directly into
the marketplace of consumer transactions. By relying on these
advertisements, the consuming public has made direct contact with
manufacturers in this marketplace. Meanwhile, the small retail
enterprise, which formerly provided direct market contact with the
consumer, has faded into a relatively faceless and exchangeable
entity under some direct or indirect control of the manufacturer.
It is no mere coincidence that cases involving the automobile
industry, and Ford Motor Company in particular (i.e. Baxter), have
been involved in landmark decisions in the advertising warranties
field. This industry pioneered the use of assembly-line techniques of
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production which so expanded our productivity. This resulting rise
in output paralleled the growth in mass-distribution advertising.
Objectively viewed, the ascendancy of advertising warranties prob-
ably reflects the capacity of American law to comprehend the
changing American economic infrastructure and to mold itself in
accordance with new problems and needs.
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